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In their comment on our article (Trippas
et al., 2014a), Singmann and Kellen (2014;
henceforth SK) suggest that our use of
signal detection theory (SDT) provides
an uninformative characterization of the
data, that our application of SDT to
causal-conditional reasoning is unneces-
sary and misguided, and that the model
does not provide a good fit of the data. We
will address each of these points.
SK’s concern that our use of SDT is
uninformative rests on a single issue: how
to interpret the shift in the location of the
confidence points along the ROC when
comparing the believable and unbelievable
conditions (Trippas et al., 2014a; Figure
1), a shift that in real terms represents a
greater tendency to accept believable argu-
ments as “valid.” We find SK’s focus on
this aspect of the data surprising because it
has no direct bearing on the main points
of the article, which have to do with the
changes in the shape and separation of the
ROCs when we segregate the data in dif-
ferent ways (Trippas et al., 2014a, Figure
1, comparing the top and bottom panels).
For this reason, we mentioned the con-
fidence point shift only once, saying that
it fits a pattern previously interpreted by
Dube et al. (2010) as a shift in response
bias, but whichmight also be due to a sym-
metric shift in the evidence distributions.
This is a succinct way of stating what SK
describe in great detail in their toy model.
We have no problem with the fact that the
confidence point shift has alternative inter-
pretations. Although it is not integral to
the thrust of the article, this aspect of the
data is worth noting because the pattern
is observed in other reasoning tasks and
represents a point of continuity despite the
apparent discontinuity in other aspects of
the ROC data.
We gather that SK’s focus on the
unidentifiability issue is meant to be a cri-
tique of the SDT model in general. In
our view, it is not a compelling critique.
Following convention, we use “accuracy”
to denote sensitivity, the ability to discrim-
inate classes of items (valid from invalid).
Accuracy depends on the relative distance
between the valid and invalid distribu-
tions. If some factor were to increase the
argument strength of invalid and valid
arguments by exactly the same degree,
accuracy would remain constant. This is
a specific circumstance which the SDT
model cannot distinguish from a shift
in response bias. The model is, however,
unambiguous in distinguishing between
changes in accuracy from those that might
be ascribed solely to response bias. This is
where the theoretical power of the model
lies (e.g., Trippas et al., 2013).
As for the question of response bias,
the SDT model is widely used in domains
like memory where criterion placement is
an issue because theorists have a range
of other tools at their disposal to deal
with ambiguity (they can, for example, use
manipulations that plausibly only affect
response bias). In their final point, SK
cite work in recognition memory (Morrell
et al., 2002) to argue that trial-by-trial
criterion shifts are implausible. These
findings describe the specific case in which
test stimuli are indistinguishable save for
an internal signal of mnemonic strength.
When the stimuli are overtly distinguish-
able on other dimensions, people seem
quite capable of shifting their criterion
from one trial to the next (Dobbins and
Kroll, 2005; Aminoff et al., 2012). Whether
people do use different response criteria
when judging believable and unbelievable
arguments remains an open question, but
the memory literature provides ample rea-
son to believe that it is plausible.
SK argue against the application of SDT
to conditional reasoning because one can
reach the same conclusions by examining
raw acceptance rates. This misses the point
of using a model like SDT, which is to
view the data within a consistent, theoret-
ically justified framework. The problems
that can arise when raw acceptance rates
are used to measure accuracy are well doc-
umented (Klauer et al., 2000; Dube et al.,
2010; Heit and Rotello, 2014) and certainly
apply here.
SK make a good point in observing that
the fit of the model to Roser and col-
leagues’ ROC curves is poor. The problem
may lie in the application of the model to
aggregated data. It is well known that G2
depends on sample size such that aggre-
gate model fits very often lead to violations
of absolute fit. One alternative approach
is to evaluate model fit for each partic-
ipant individually (Cohen et al., 2008).
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To demonstrate the problematic nature of
assessing the model fit of aggregated sam-
ples in terms of G2 when sample sizes are
large, we combined data from 131 partic-
ipants from previously published work on
belief bias (Trippas et al., 2013, 2014b). We
fit the believable and unbelievable ROCs
separately, both aggregated and on a per-
participant basis. The aggregate fit to the
believable ROC was borderline acceptable,
G2(3) = 6.97, p = 0.07. For the unbeliev-
able ROC, the fit was unacceptable, G2(3) =
50.6, p < 0.001. The individual fits paint
a prettier picture: for the believable prob-
lems, only 9 out of 131 or less than 7%
of the participants show a violation of
fit (p < 0.05). The unbelievable-problems
case fares even better, with only 4 out
of 131 or about 3% of the participants
producing ill-fitting data patterns. How
can such drastically different patterns of
fit emerge? Individual differences poten-
tially play a large role: unbelievable prob-
lems elicit different reasoning strategies
in different people (Trippas et al., 2013,
2014b,c), and aggregating across such data
patterns will suggest that the model is
inappropriate. We suspect that similar fac-
tors have contributed to the poor fits
reported by SK.
SK’s comments speak to a number
of interesting issues that deserve to be
raised in the wider discussion surround-
ing the SDT approach to modeling human
reasoning. It is useful, however, to reit-
erate the point of our original article
which seems to be lost in the discus-
sion of side issues. A strict adherence
to “normativism” often leads investigators
to biased or misleading interpretations of
phenomena (Elqayam and Evans, 2011).
The default normative approach to the
application of SDT to reasoning illustrates
precisely this problem in the case of causal
conditionals.
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